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I. RATIONALITY AS A NORMATIVE IDEAL
The theory of rational choice, as understood by most economists
and many other social scientists, has both a normative and a positive
content. Normatively, it points to what should be done maximally to
achieve some given end, and, while it might not prescribe any particu-
lar end, it points to what it is to have a consistent set of ends that are
capable of being so maximized. For example, if an agent had a set of
ends that gave rise to a cyclical ordering of available alternatives, that
is, if she preferred x to y, y to z, and z to x, it would not be possible for
her to choose any one of these alternatives without another of the al-
ternatives being preferred to it according to her own criteria for
choice. In other words, it would not be possible for her to satisfy
completely, or maximize, her own ends.'
Positively, the theory of rational choice is used to describe, ex-
plain, and predict human behavior. Agents are assumed generally to
behave in an internally consistent way that can be rationalized by the
theory of maximization. Thus, if an agent has already chosen alterna-
tive y over alternative z, and then chooses alternative x over alternative
y, the assumption, and prediction, will be that the agent will choose
alternative x over alternative z.
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I For a good discussion of rational choice construed as maximization, and the
properties that are consequently required for the underlying preference relation, see
AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 7-20 (1970).
2 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Formulation of Rational Choice, 84 AM. ECON. REV. PROC.
385, 385 (1994) (noting that rationality is assumed to mean acting to maximize a utility
payoff); Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 ECONOMETRICA 745, 746
(1997) (distinguishing "maximization," which only requires choosing an alternative
that is not judged to be worse than any other, from "optimization," which, more
strongly, requires choosing an alternative that is better than all others).
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Recently, the positive theory has come under attack from experi-
mental psychologists and economists. 3 Their experimental results,
gathered together under the banner of behavioral analysis, show that
the maximizing model of rational choice often does not provide a very
accurate account of how agents actually choose. Moreover, the depar-
tures from the model appear systematic rather than random, suggest-
ing that something other than maximization is going on.
However, the general tenor of these studies is not to question the
normative ideal of maximization. Rather, the departures from the
standard account of rational choice are typically characterized, and
criticized, as failures to be rational. Agents are only human beings,
after all, and human beings are subject to the limitations that must,
inevitably and systematically, arise out of personal biases, limits on the
salience and availability of important information, and the distorting
effects of how a given problem is framed. Thus, real-world agents are
only, it is said, capable of a "bounded rationality," using "rules of
thumb" and various "heuristics" (sometimes helpful, sometimes not)
rather than the fully fledged maximizing rationality that is still largely
accepted as the ideal for rational choice.4
In this Article, I argue that for many decision-making problems,
the normative account of rationality that animates rational choice
theory, and notjust the positive account that is criticized by the behav-
iorists, is deficient, even as a theory of ideally rational behavior. Ra-
3 The literature is now huge. Good selections can be found in CHOICES, VALUES,
AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY (Robin M. Hogarth
& Melvin W. Reder eds., 2d ed. 1987). For a wide-ranging textbook treatment of many
of the relevant issues, seeJONATFIAN BARON, TIHINKING AND DECIDING (3d ed. 2000).
4 This is quite clearly Jonathan Baron's view. See BARON, supra note 3, at 66 (not-
ing that, for one reason or another, people often fail to follow prescriptive models of
decision making and rationality). However, not all theorists of "bounded rationality"
think of its "boundedness" as setting constraints on what, ideally, rationality would
otherwise require of us. As one pair of theorists wrote:
Bounded rationality is, however, not simply a discrepancy between human
reasoning and the laws of probability or some form of optimization. Bounded
rationality dispenses with the notion of optimization and, usually, with prob-
abilities and utilities as well. It provides an alternative to current norms, not
an account that accepts current norms and studies when humans deviate from
these norms. Bounded rationality means rethinking the norms as well as
studying the actual behavior of minds and institutions.
Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, Rethinking Rationality, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY:
THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 1, 6 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001). On
this view, bounded rationality provides an alternative account of ideally rational behav-
ior.
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tionality, I shall suggest, provides for an ordered particularity, including
particular decisions, but the notion of an ordering that informs this
alternative account of ideally rational behavior, and which is more ap-
propriate in some decision-making contexts (including many legal
ones), is very different from the idea of an ordering that informs the
standard account within rational choice theory. The latter, which, as
already suggested, is closely allied to the idea of maximization, remains
largely quantitative and single-minded in its orientation, this despite
the pluralism of motivations that it appears to be able and willing to
accommodate within its seemingly minimalist structure.5 The alterna-
tive account is more qualitative, or categorical (although not abso-
lute), offering a conception of a rational ordering of particularity that
is more allied to the idea of an understanding or interpretation (under
rules or principles) than it is to maximization. At the risk of import-
5 The structure of conventional rational choice is minimalist in the sense that it
only seems to require that an agent (1) be able to order any set of available alternatives
from best to worst, and (2) not choose an alternative x from that set if there is another
alternative that is better than (or more preferred to) x according to this ordering.
(More structure is required for rational choice over uncertain alternatives, including,
most importantly, the so-called "sure thing" principle. For a discussion of this princi-
ple, see infra note 35 and accompanying text.) Requirement (1) appears to be open to
any possible motivation or criterion for choice (including concerns for justice, altru-
ism, respect for the environment, process values, etc.); requirement (2), while captur-
ing the idea of maximization, seems to follow simply from taking these different moti-
vations or criteria seriously. Why settle on choosing some alternative if there is
another alternative available that is better according to one's own criteria for choice?
However, as I hope to demonstrate in this Article, there is already enough in this ap-
parently minimalist structure to prevent us from accommodating some attractive (non-
maximizing) principles of choice as rational.
6 Compare the characterization of these two alternative accounts of rational deci-
sion making provided by Drazen Prelec:
Decision analysis, which codifies the rational model, views choice as a fun-
damentally technical problem of choosing the course of action that maximizes
a unidimensional criterion, such as value or utility. The primary mental activ-
ity... is the reduction of multiple attributes or dimensions to a single one,
through a specification of value trade-offs .... For rule-governed action, the
fundamental decision problem is the quasi-legal one of constructing a satisfy-
ing interpretation of the choice situation. The primary mental activity in-
volved in this process is the exploration of analogies and distinctions between
the current situation, and other "canonical" choice situations in which a single
rule or principle unambiguously applies.
Values and Principles: Some Limitations on Traditional Economic Analysis, in SOCIO-
ECONOMics: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS 131, 131 (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence
eds., 1991). For some suggestions about how the differences between maximization
and reasoning by analogy might be captured in choice theoretic terms, see Bruce
Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U.
Cn. L. REV. 41 (1994).
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ing some unnecessary baggage, but for reasons that I hope will be-
come clearer as the argument unfolds, I refer to this alternative con-
ception of rationality as categorical reason. If that phrase suggests a
longstanding rationalist tradition, exemplified by Kant, but rejected
by the British empiricists like Hobbes and Hume, who are the most
likely intellectual ancestors of contemporary rational choice theorists,
that is not entirely unwelcome
The real challenge for this Article, however, is not so much to ar-
ticulate two alternative accounts of rationality that have had some tra-
ditional followers, but to begin to make each accessible to the other
within some common intellectual framework. While I think rational
choice theory provides a useful and precise set of tools for beginning
this process of achieving mutual understanding between the tradi-
tions, I shall argue that some quite fundamental postulates of rational
choice theory (including some of the axioms of choice consistency
and strong independence) will have to be relaxed if the contributions
of categorical reason are properly to be accommodated within it.
However, I hope to show that there is much advantage in this, even
for what the rational choice theorist hopes to achieve, and to illustrate
7 For a concise account of the intellectual origins of rational choice theory in the
works of Hobbes and Hume, see Martin Hollis & Robert Sugden, Rationality in Action,
102 MIND (n.s.) 1, 2-7 (1993). In interpretations of Kant, the word "categorical," as in
"categorical imperative," is often thought to mean "absolute" or "without qualifica-
tion"; for an example of this interpretation, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 9-
13 (1978). This is not the meaning of "categorical" I mean to suggest in my phrase
"categorical reason." See infra text following note 77 (discussing the concept of "cate-
gorical reason"). Rather, I mean something more like "within categories" or "accord-
ing to rules," as in the following:
Everything in nature, both in the lifeless and in the living world, takes place
according to rules, although we are not always acquainted with these rules ....
The whole of nature in general is really nothing but a connection of appear-
ances according to rules; and there is no absence of rules anywhere. If we be-
lieve we have found such a thing, then in this case we can only say that we are
not acquainted with the rules.
The exercise of our powers also takes place according to certain rules that
we follow, unconscious of them at first, until we gradually arrive at cognition of
them through experiments and lengthy use of our powers, indeed, until we
finally become so familiar with them that it costs us much effort to think them
in abstracto ....
Like all our powers, the understanding in particular is bound in its actions to
rules, which we can investigate. Indeed, the understanding is to be regarded
in general as the source and the faculty for thinking rules in general. For...
the understanding is the faculty for thinking, i.e., for bringing the representa-
tions of the senses under rules.
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON LOGIC 527 J. Michael Young ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1992) (1800).
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the point by reference to some systematic difficulties that the rational
choice theorist faces in the theory of social choice and game theory.
Part II reviews the results of some recent behavioral experiments
that suggest that agents respond to reasons in a way that is not always
consistent with some of the fundamental axioms of (value-based) ra-
tional choice. I look at choice involving certain and uncertain alter-
natives, and focus on the weak axiom of revealed preference in the
former and the sure thing principle in the latter. My claim is that
while some of the choices that some of these experimental subjects
make do seem problematic from a rational point of view, sensible sce-
narios can be constructed that make good sense of these systematic
violations of the rationality axioms.
In Part III, I argue that common law adjudication manifests the
same tension between reason-based choice and conventional (value-
based) rational choice that was shown in the experiments. However, I
argue that the common law idealizes reason-based choice, insisting
not only that a claimant be right, but that a claimant be right and ra-
tional-that is, right for the right reasons. I refer to this reason-based
ideal as categorical reason.
In Part V, I suggest that the idea of categorical reason can be use-
ful both in the theory of social choice and in the theory of noncoop-
erative games. In social choice, categorical reason brings a kind of
conceptual discipline to the preferences that can be admitted into so-
cial choice, and this helps to avoid certain problems of instability and
collective irrationality. In the theory of games, categorical reason
publicly organizes the particularity of individual agents' choices so
that coordination and cooperation are more likely to occur.
II. RATIONAL CHOICE BEHAVIORISM AND REASON-BASED CHOICE
A. The Case of Certainty
One might have thought, or even hoped, that a theory of rational
choice would have informed us about how people think or deliberate
about their decisions, or about how their choices are explained orjus-
tified by reasons. That, typically, is how a legal theorist would under-
stand the obligation to offer an account of rational decision making.
At the end of their article on "reasons," for example, John Gardner
and Timothy Macklem conclude that rationality "is simply the capacity
11732003]
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and propensity to act (think, feel, etc.) only and always for undefeated
reasons."
8
However, the agenda for developments in the economic theory of
rational choice has, apparently, been one of psychological reduction-
ism. The idea, which began with Vilfredo Pareto's replacement of
cardinal with ordinal utility as a motivation for choice in the early part
of the twentieth century, ' has been to rely less and less on any claims
about what might be going on in someone's head.'0 With the advent
of revealed preference theory, as originally developed by Paul Samuel-
son in the 1930s," the expunging of anything psychologically substan-
tial that might explain a set of rational choices, like the maximization
of self-interest, utility, or, now, even preference, is more or less complete.
What matters for rationality is the consistency of externally observable be-
havior, not any particular subjective motivation." This reliance on
what is objectively observable is typically thought to be "scientifically
more respectable"" than any attempt to speculate about, and model,
private thoughts, motivations, or reasons.
Of course, the requirements of a rational consistency of observ-
able choice are not unrelated to the requirements of a rational maxi-
mization of unobservable preference or utility. Indeed, the former,
while considered a fully autonomous subject matter for the scientific
and systematic study of choice, is still typically thought capable of be-
ing "rationalized" by the latter. Thus, Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference ("WARP")," which is still the central postulate of the
new behaviorism in cases of choice over certain outcomes, has been
8 John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440, 474 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds., 2002).
9VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 103-209 (Ann S. Schwier &
Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1927).
10 For a discussion of the historical developments in the theory of utility as a moti-
vation for rational choice, see MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 343-53
(3d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1978) (1962).
11 P.A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA
(n.s.) 61, 61-71 (1938).
12 See, e.g., J.R. HICKS, A REVISION OF DEMAND THEORY 6 (1956) ("[T]he
econometric theory of demand does study human beings, but only as entities having
certain patterns of market behaviour; it makes no claim, no pretence, to be able to see
inside their heads.").
1 See I.M.D. Little, A Reformulation of the Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 1 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 90, 97 (1949) (noting tiat objective observation has been deemed
"scientifically more respectable" because it allows explanation of behavior "without
reference to anything other than" behavior).
14 Samuelson, supra note 11, at 62-70.
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shown to be logically implied by, and consistent with, what would be
chosen by a rational maximizer of preferences.'5 According to WARP,
if an agent ever chooses an alternative x over alternative y from some
set of alternatives, then that agent should never (on pain of inconsis-
tency) choose alternative y over alternative x from any other set of
available alternatives."
One is tempted to add "unless, of course, her preferences have
changed," but this would be to seek refuge in a preference-theoretic
explanation of a possible departure from what is supposed to be a
purely choice-theoretic requirement. Nevertheless, the temptation is
revealing in that it shows what really lies behind WARP as a plausible
requirement for rational choice. The idea, surely, is that an ideally ra-
tional agent can arrange all conceivable alternatives in order of prefer-
ence and would choose, from any available subset of those alternatives,
the one that was highest in that ordering. Such an agent would never
violate WARP. Further, an agent satisfying WARP would always
choose as if she had such a preference ordering and were maximizing
it.
At first glance this last claim might seem odd, since there does not
seem to be enough in WARP to generate the thought that there must
be an underlying transitive preference relation motivating choice. For
example, if an agent chose x from the choice set (x, y), y from the
choice set (y, z), and z from the choice set (x, z), there would not yet
be any violation of WARP, although the choices do seem to reveal an
intransitive preference ordering, something that can frustrate maxi-
mization." However, the violation of WARP is manifest if we can re-
quire that the agent now show us a consistent choice over the choice
set (x, y, z), that is, if we take seriously the idea that the agent must, in
a way analogous to the complete preference requirement, be consis-
tent in her choices over any conceivable set of available alternatives.
For, given her first three choices over the three different pairs, the
agent cannot now choose any alternative from the triple (x, y, z) with-
15 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Rational Choice Functions and Orderings, 26 ECONOMICA
(n.s.) 121, 126 (1959) ("The most interesting conclusion is the complete equivalence
of [WARP] with the existence of an ordering from which the choice function can be
derived."); see also Amartya K. Sen, Choice Functions and Revealed Preference, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 307, 310-11 (1971) (proving the logical equivalence of WARP with choice
under a rational preference relation).
16 Arrow, supra note 15, at 123.
7 See supra text accompanying note 1 (introducing the normative theory of ra-
tional choice as maximization).
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out violating WARP." Thus, a rational maximizer of preferences will
choose in a way that satisfies the behavioral requirements of WARP,
and an observable chooser satisfying the requirements of WARP will
choose as if she had a fully transitive preference ordering that she was
maximizing. It does not appear, therefore, that the behaviorist revo-
lution has offered up any real surprises at the level of principle.
Of course, where behaviorism has offered up something new is in
the recent experimental research that shows that agents do not actu-
ally choose in the way that the most minimal consistency conditions,
like WARP, seem to require. That is, the choice between two alterna-
tives x and y can vary-indeed, it can be reversed-according to what
else is in the available set of alternatives. To the extent that this ap-
pears to be systematic and predictable, it suggests that these choices
cannot be rationalized as the maximization of preference. It is a dif-
ferent question, perhaps, whether they can be rationalized at all.
The most interesting experimental results for the purposes of this
Article are those offered by Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson, and Amos
Tversky around the idea of "reason-based choice."' ' These authors
begin by contrasting reason-based choice with value-based choice, the
latter being their name for the economic theory of rational choice.
On this latter view, a value is associated with each alternative and
choice is characterized as the maximization of value. Reason-based
choice, on the other hand, is more characteristic of legal scholarship 0
and analyses of historically significant case studies.2' It "identifies vari-
ous reasons and arguments that are purported to enter into and in-
fluence decision, and explains choice in terms of the balance of rea-
sons for and against the various alternatives. 2' This, they admit, is a
somewhat vague characterization of rational choice, and it might not
be clear why there would necessarily be any incompatibility between
value- and reason-based choice. Surely the "values" of different alter-
10 See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 58 (1982) ("[N]o mat-
ter what he chose out of this set of three alternatives ... he must violate [WARP].").
19 Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra
note 3, at 597, 597-619; see also Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-Dependent
Preferences, 39 MGMT. SC. 1179, 1179 (1993) (discussing empirical findings inconsigtent
with value maximization and presenting a context-dependent model of choice).
20 Shafir et al., supra note 19, at 598; see also infra Part Ill (suggesting that common
law adjudication is a form of reason-based choice).
21 For example, reason-based choice analysis has been applied to a study of the
Cuban Missile Crisis. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971), cited in Shafir et al., supra note 19, at 598.
22 Id.
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natives provide good reasons for choosing them, the argument might
go, and it seems natural to think that the balance of values would pro-
vide a good indication of where the balance of reasons is ultimately to
be found. However, their precisely constructed experiments serve to
indicate more clearly what is meant by reason-based choice and why
the conflict with value-based choice can potentially arise.
The experiments show that agents will often latch onto a reason
for choosing a particular alternative just to resolve the conflict that
they feel in facing choice. The "irrationality," at least from a rational
choice perspective, is that almost any reason, including a seemingly
"irrelevant" one, will do. For example, some subjects were asked to
choose between alternative x, six dollars in cash, and y, a high quality
pen. 3 The pen was chosen by 36% of the subjects and the remaining
64% chose the cash. 4 However, when the subjects were presented
with a choice from these same two options together with a third, z,
another pen that was of clearly inferior quality to the first, then the
percentage of subjects that chose y, the higher quality pen, rose dra-
matically.15 This appears to suggest that many subjects who would
choose x over y, when only those alternatives are available, will choose
y over x when some third alternative, z, is added to the set of available
alternatives, a violation of WARP.
The explanation offered is that these subjects now have a reason to
choose y, namely, that it is a pen of clearly superior quality to z, a rea-
son that they did not have when z was unavailable." However, this pat-
tern of choices does appear somewhat "irrational." The fact that y is
an alternative that is obviously better than z provides a good reason
for choosing y over z, but it appears to provide little reason for choos-
ing y over a quite different alternative x. Indeed, as nothing about the
values of x and y is changed by introducing z into the choice set, one
might have thought that nothing would change for a rational chooser
in a value-based choice between x and y. This property of "rational"
consistency is what is captured by WARP and what is violated so sys-
tematically by the experimental results.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to construct a different scenario
where it seems more sensible to think that the addition of some alter-
native z might change the choice between alternatives x and y. Sup-
23 Id. at 609.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 610.
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pose, for example, that someone is offered a choice of fruit at the end
of a dinner. 7 If only a large apple, A, and a large orange, 0, are of-
fered to her, she would choose the large apple. Both fruits are large
and, all else equal, she prefers apples to oranges. However, if she is
offered A, 0, and a small apple, a, then different considerations arise.
For now there is an issue of etiquette to be addressed. The rule, let us
say, is that one should never choose the larger of two items of the
same kind. Our chooser now reasons that, in the choice from the set
(A, 0, a), she cannot now choose A, because that would be in breach
of the rule of etiquette. She therefore chooses 0, a piece of fruit that
is larger than a, but a fruit of a different kind. Thus, from the set of
alternatives (A, 0), she chooses A; but from the set of alternatives (A,
0, a), she chooses 0, a violation of WARP.
The chooser would also reveal an intransitive preference ordering
if the different fruits were offered to her in pairs. She would choose A
from the pair (A, 0), 0 from the pair (0, a), and a from the pair (a,
A), in violation of transitivity. The reason, of course, is that the rule of
etiquette does not come into play until the third choice, when the big
and small apples are presented together. Until that point the chooser
can select between the fruits purely according to taste, or according to
the different values of the different alternatives, choosing the highest
valued one; in other words, she can choose in the way that the theory
of value-based choice and maximization suggests. But when the two
apples are presented together, etiquette becomes an issue between
them, that is, as an issue bearing on the relationship between those two
alternatives, not as a property or value of either of the two alternatives
considered on its own. In this way we can say that the concern for eti-
quette, unlike the concern for taste, is a partition-dependent or categorical
idea; it arises only when the two alternatives, a and A, appear together
within some partition of the alternatives.'s
27 This example is now much discussed. The earliest published analysis of it of
which I am aware is in Philip Pettit, Decision Theory and Folk Psychology, in FOUNDATIONS
OF DECISION THEORY 147, 163 (Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley eds., 1991). The
example, and close variations of it, is also analyzed in Paul Anand, The Philosophy of In-
transitive Preference, 103 ECON. J. 337, 344 (1993); Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensura-
bility, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487, 1498-99, 1503-05
(1998); Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRICA 495, 501 (1993).
See also Amartya Sen, Is the Idea of Purely Internal Consistency of Choice Bizarre?, in WORLD,
MIND, AND ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF BERNARD WILLIAMS 19, 24
U.E.J. Altham & Ross Harrison eds., 1995) [hereinafter Sen, Bizarre] (showing the epis-
temic relevance of a different menu of alternatives).
28 For other examples used to make the same point, see JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING
GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND TIME 100-01 (1991); ISAAC LEVI, HARD
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The etiquette example provides, therefore, another instance of
reason-based choice pulling the chooser in a direction different from
that prescribed by the logic of value-based choice. The presence of a
in the set of alternatives gives our chooser a reason in etiquette for not
choosing A. But, just as for the experimental results referred to ear-
lier, this is a reason that does not seem to be relevant to any compari-
son between A and 0; it is a very partition-dependent consideration.
The values of A and 0 as alternatives would appear to be unchanged,
and the choice between them, one might have thought, would be un-
affected by such an "irrelevant" reason.
Yet, despite this apparent "irrationality," what is happening in the
etiquette example is hardly incomprehensible to us, at least if we have
any sort of feel for the rule of etiquette that is involved. We simply
understand the choice situation (A, 0, a), where both A and a are pres-
ent and etiquette is at issue, differently from the choice situation (A, 0),
where a is absent and etiquette is not at issue. And this different un-
derstanding, which turns on the availability of an alternative that is it-
self never chosen, requires that a different choice be made over those
two alternatives A and 0, which were always available for choice.
Thus, it is not as if the different understanding arises simply because a
different set of available alternatives means we can now choose some-
thing different, and more particularly something better, which was not
available earlier. That sort of different understanding, which does
CHOICES: DECISION MAKING UNDER UNRESOLVED CONFLIC1" 33, 105 (1986); James F.
Reynolds & David C. Paris, The Concept of 'Choice' and Arrow's Theorem, 89 ETHICS 354,
363 (1979).
29 Not surprisingly, this is how the committed rational choice theorist typically
solves the etiquette problem and others like it. See, e.g., BARON, supra note 3, at 235
(arguing that, because of the relevance of etiquette, a large apple does not mean the
same thing when compared to a large orange as it does when compared to a small ap-
ple). What appears as an inconsistent choice over the same pair of alternatives is actu-
ally a choice over a different pair of alternatives and, therefore, the issue of inconsis-
tency cannot arise. Choosing "the big apple A from a set where the little apple a is
available" is simply not the same as choosing "the big apple A from a set where the lit-
tle apple a is not available," or so the argument goes. We might even capture this idea
by more accurately relabeling the two alternatives for choice as A/a and A/-a, respec-
tively (where A/a is read "A when a is also available" and Al-a is read "A when a is not
also available"). Thus, the apparent inconsistency of choosing A from the set (A, 0)
and 0 from the set (A, 0, a), for example, is resolved under this redescription of the
problem as choosing A/-a from the set (A/-a, 0) and 0 from the set (A/a, 0, a), in
perfect conformity with choice consistency conditions like WARP. This "solves" the
difficulty, but only at the cost of rendering the choice consistency requirements vacu-
ous. As Sen observed, "[i]f every time the set from which the choice is being made
changes, the choice of any given alternative ... is taken to be a different choice[,] ...
then no condition of internal consistency of choices from different subsets can make
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not affect our understanding of the previously available alternatives,
would always be relevant to a maximization of value. Rather, the dif-
ferent understanding arises because the addition of the new alterna-
tive changes how the previously available alternatives, themselves un-
changed, are now conceived. And this new understanding changes how
we choose between those previously available alternatives. Thus, this
any demand whatsoever." Sen, Bizare, supra note 27, at 26. This is a heavy price to pay
to "secure" the conventional requirements of rationality in rational choice theory.
Moreover, the very act of redescribing the alternatives according to what else is avail-
able in the choice set concedes the point at issue, viz., that what we are doing in choice,
and what we want to do tinder that description, varies with the set of available alterna-
tives. This variation is only obscured, and not preserved as a subject requiring more
thorough analysis, if we simply provide a new set of partition-dependent descriptions of
the alternatives to preserve a partition-independent choice consistency condition. To his
credit, John Broome has at least recognized that the redescription strategy must be re-
fined so that something of the original force of the conventional rationality conditions
can be preserved without reducing them to the worst forms of "ad hocery." See
BROOME, supra note 28, at 102-07 (discussing the recognition of rational requirements
of indifference as a way of dealing with the problem of emptiness). However,
Broome's refinement strategy, which allows alternatives to be "individuated" in the way
described earlier, either begs the question (in that rationally justified differences in
choice still have to be justified as differences between the alternatives separately con-
sidered) or generates a quite different problem for rational choice in that some alter-
natives cannot now logically be compared, something which violates the completeness
reqtirement. For a discussion of the relationship between completeness and rational-
ity, see infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
3I0 For an interesting paper relating the conventional choice consistency condi-
tions (like WARP) to the equally conventional monotonicity requirements of classical
logic, see RUVIN GEKKER, NONMONOTONIC REASONING AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
RATIONAL CHOICE (European Pub. Choice Soc'y, Working Paper No. 61, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.economics.n uigalway.ie/downloads/papers/0061paper.pdf. Under
monotonicity, if some proposition p is sufficient to imply another proposition q, then
the compound proposition p and rshould also imply q; in other words, the sufficiency
of p for q should not be undermined by adding r. However, under non-monotonic or
defeasible reasoning, this is precisely what is relaxed. While p on its own might be suf-
ficient for q, the addition of proposition rcan imply not-q.
In the etiquette example, the non-monotonicity is found in the following: Let
proposition p be "options A and 0 are available for choice," let proposition q be "I
should choose A and not 0," and let proposition r be "option a is available for choice."
Then, under the obligation to choose something according to the desire to eat (larger
pieces of) fruit and the rules of etiquette, while p implies q, p and r implies not-q. (In
fact p and r implies, "I should choose 0 and not A.")
It is arguable that much of legal reasoning and legal argument proceeds non-
monotonically. Certainly the desire to provide an adequate model of legal reasoning
has been one of the great motivators for the development of non-monotonic or defea-
sible logics in recent years. See, e.g., JAAP C. HAGE, REASONING WITH RULES: AN ESSAY
ON LEGAL REASONING AND ITS UNDERLYING LOGIC, at xiii (1997) (discussing defeasibil-
ity of reasoning with rules, "in particular legal rules"). For example, the addition of a
certain legal defense r, while not relevant or even admissible as a consideration until
the prima facie case p is in place (it is a defense after all), can reverse or defease the le-
CA TEGORICAL REASON
is different choice under a truly different understanding of the (same)
alternatives (themselves unchanged in value); it is not different choice
simply because (trivially, we now understand that) differently valued
alternatives are now available. Where WARP allows the latter role for
an altered "understanding," it does not allow the former.
Yet the idea that we might choose differently over empirically in-
distinguishable alternatives because we have a different understanding
of the issues that are at stake in our choice is hardly novel. Consider
the example of how one chooses as a friend, something Aristotle dis-
cussed at some length.' It is widely appreciated that there is some-
thing problematic about choosing to be someone's friend for instru-
mental reasons, especially, say, if one is being a friend (or seeking the
good for one's friend) simply because it makes one better off. There
may be reciprocity or mutual "back scratching" in that, but it fails
fundamentally as friendship. The test (although not, of course, the
end) of true friendship is in the willingness to continue acting as a
friend even if doing so makes one worse off.
This much is elementary, but we can take the basic insight further.
A true friend cannot even have the value of having friends as the rea-
son she does what friends do. That is also too instrumental; it puts the
value of having friends before the friendship itself. Even if the actor
sees her conduct as perfecting friendship, or seeking (too much) to
do what it is that friends do, it would still be too calculating and too
(self-consciously) goal-oriented for genuine friendship. But suppose
she says, in response to some proposal, "That's not what friends do; I
cannot do that." Then the concept of friendship informs what she
does, although it does not guide what she does in the way that a goal
(e.g., the goal or value of achieving or maintaining friendship) might.
She acts under an understanding of what friendship is, even of what
friendship requires, but she does not, strictly, act that way because
friendship requires it. The latter suggests too much that there is a
gal outcome q that would otherwise be implied by p. I have argued elsewhere that de-
feasible rules provide an innovative, rational, and peculiarly legal structure for the ac-
commodation of plural values in collective decision making, and one that cannot be
captured within the conventions of rational choice theory. Bruce Chapman, Law
Games: Defeasible Rules and Revisable Rationality, 17 LAW & PHIL. 443, 446 (1998);
Chapman, supra note 27, at 1494-95; see alsoJohn L. Pollock, A Theory of Moral Reason-
ing, 96 ETHICS 506, 512-20 (1986) (arguing that defeasibility should provide the logical
structure for moral reasoning more generally).
31 Aristotle devotes two books of The Nicomachean Ethics to friendship. SeeJohn M.
Cooper, Aristotle on Friendship, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 301, 301-40 (Amnlie
Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) (discussing Aristotle's writings on friendship).
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moment when she can understand the alternatives for choice inde-
pendent of the concept of friendship, and then go on to choose
amongst them as friendship, now brought to bear upon the choice,
would have her do. But the concept or category of friendship in-
forms, and orders, the particularity of her choices in a more gapless or
immediate way. She sees the choice as directly implicating friendship,
as a particular immediately implicates the category of which it is an in-
stance. And she chooses as a friend, with the result that,just as imme-
diately, she instantiates the category in the particularity of what she
does. In this way, the concept of friendship can be the reason for, or
the ordering of, her acting the way she does, even if the value of
friendship cannot.
This is not to say that there is no value to be achieved in friend-
ship or that friendship does not connect to something valuable. If
everyone acts under the aspect of friendship, where friendship ration-
ally orders or gives reason to what they do, then the good of friend-
ship is likely to be achieved and enjoyed. And there is value in that.
But still, it seems quite plausible to say that the value of friendship is
no part of our rationale for acting as friends. We act one way rather
than another simply because we know what it is to be friends. The
value we achieve is merely an incidental by-product, maybe even an
essentially incidental by-product,32 of our acting on this knowledge and
for this reason.
This digression into the notion of friendship has served to illus-
trate that there is a long and durable tradition in the idea that an un-
derstanding, or a concept, can act as a reason for choice. This tradi-
tion also suggests that there is a difference between reason based on
such a concept and reason based on value. The importance of the
etiquette example is that it shows precisely where this difference is to
be found within the axioms of rational choice theory. Where a differ-
ent concept gives rise to a different understanding of the alternatives
available for choice, even a different understanding of all those alter-
natives that continue to be available as other alternatives change, then
choice may vary according to that changing understanding, even for
3 For a discussion of social states that are "essentially by-products," that is, states
that "can only come about as the by-product[s] of actions undertaken for other ends,"
see JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 43
(1983). See aLto Robert Sugden, Rational Choice: A Sumey of Contributions from Economics
and Philosophy, 101 ECON. J. 751, 781 (1991) (linking Elster's idea to problems of self-
defeating rationality in the theory of rational choice and, in particular, the problem of
rational commitment).
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those alternatives that continue to be available. While this might trouble
the rational choice theorist committed to certain choice consistency
conditions like WARP, conditions that make sense on a view of ra-
tional choice that is value-maximizing and goal-oriented, it is less clear
that such variations should surprise those whose conception of ra-
tional choice is to be found more in the idea that particular decisions
are rational to the extent that they can be ordered, or organized, un-
der the aspect of different concepts, understandings, or categories of
thought.
B. The Case of Uncertainty
The discussion so far has related to choice over certain alterna-
tives. We have been questioning whether the idea of maximizing
one's preferences (or values) over those alternatives, even if that only
takes its behaviorist form as a choice consistency condition like WARP,
is the only sensible conception of rational choice, or whether an al-
ternative conception, sensitive to the different understandings that a
chooser might bring to a choice problem, might also provide an ac-
count of rational ordering of particular decisions.
However, the most general theory of rational choice, which pur-
ports to rationalize behavior as expected utility maximization, deals with
• • 33
choice over risky alternatives. Of course, to handle the more general
case, some further choice axioms are required. In this Section, we will
focus on one in particular, namely, the strong independence assump-
tion or "sure thing principle.
3
1
The sure thing principle has been characterized as "[t]he key
,35qualitative property that gives rise to expected utility theory," and so
33 Within this more general theory, certain choice is interpreted as the trivial case
where the probabilities for the different possible outcomes are reduced to either one
or zero.
34 For a discussion of the axioms underlying expected utility maximization (or the
idea that an agent's observable choices over uncertain alternatives can be rationalized,
or represented, as the maximization of that agent's expectation of utility), see R.
DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 23-31 (1957). Luce and
Raiffa refer to the strong independence assumption as "substitutibility." Id. at 27. For
a discussion of the possible origins of the name "sure thing principle," see LEONARDJ.
SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 21-24 (1972). "Strong independence" is the
name that Paul Samuelson uses for the axiom. See Paul A. Samuelson, Probability, Util-
ity, and the Independence Axiom, 20 ECONOMETRICA 670, 670 (1952) (asserting that
strong independence conditions "create the existence of certain special or canonical
indexes of utility and probability that are additive").
35 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 3, at 209, 210.
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it is important to have a sense of what it means. Roughly, the princi-
ple allows the chooser to cancel or eliminate from her consideration
any possible state of the world that yields the same outcome (the "sure
thing") regardless of one's choice. Suppose, for example, that one
can choose between two lotteries, A and B, where A provides for a sea-
side vacation if one draws (from 100 possible numbered tickets) a
number between 1 and 10 and $100 for any number between 11 and
100, and B offers a mountain vacation on the chance that you draw a
number between 1 and 10 and $100 for any number between 11 and
100. Since all the possible draws of numbers between 11 and 100 yield
the same outcome of $100, the sure thing principle tells us that the
choice between the lotteries should turn only on the chooser's prefer-
ence between the possibilities of vacationing at the seaside or in the
mountains.
Suppose that the chooser indicates a preference for lottery A over
lottery B, indicating a preference for the seaside vacation. Now con-
sider a third lottery, C, which offers a seaside vacation if one draws a
number between 1 and 10 and $200 if one draws a number between
11 and 100. By the same sure thing principle, the choice between lot-
tery C and lottery A should turn on the chooser's preference between
$200 and $100. Suppose, as seems reasonable, that the chooser pre-
fers lottery C because, all other (vacation) possibilities equal, it offers
(the same chance of) a larger cash award. Thus, C is preferred to A, A
is preferred to B, and, by transitivity, C is preferred to B. And surely
this last implication (based on transitivity) makes sense even on a di-
rect application of the sure thing principle. If lottery C is preferred to
lottery B in every possible world that might occur (i.e., because of the
preference for a seaside vacation over a mountain vacation if a num-
ber between 1 and 10 is chosen, and because of the preference for
more cash rather than less in the event that a number between 11 and
100 is chosen), then lottery C should be preferred to lottery B even
when the exact state of the world (or which number might be chosen)
is still unknown. If this were not the case, that is, if lottery B were pre-
ferred to lottery C, then there would have to be something attractive
in the lottery as such, that is, in the particular combination of (mutually
exclusive) possibilities that B offers, namely, a less preferred vacation
and less cash, which allows lottery B to be more attractive for the
chooser even though each possibility considered on its own is dis-
preferred. This would, of course, violate the strong independence prop-
erties of the sure thing principle.
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However, despite the apparent rationality of the sure thing prin-
ciple, behavioral research indicates that it is systematically violated by
experimental subjects. The subjects appear to reveal what the behav-
iorists have called a "disjunction effect."3 '' That is, the subjects will in-
dicate a preference for some choice x over another choice y when they
know that event A obtains, and they will also indicate this same pref-
erence when they know that event A does not obtain, but they will in-
dicate a preference for y over x when it is unknown whether or not A
obtains. This is a violation of the sure thing principle. What is most
interesting about this research is the explanation for why this disjunc-
tion effect occurs. As we shall now see, the explanation again points
to the importance of reason-based choice.
In one of these experiments, all the student subjects were asked to
imagine that they had just taken a very difficult qualifying examina-
tion near the end of the fall term.3 v Some of these students were then
asked whether they would take advantage of a very attractive holiday
18package in Hawaii if they knew they had passed the exam. Others
were asked whether they would take advantage of the same package if
they knew they had failed the exam. 3" A majority of the students indi-
cated that they would choose the vacation package in each of these
two possible states of the world.4° However, when the students were
asked if they would choose the package if they did not know whether
they had passed or failed, less than a third of the students chose the
package and more than 60% were willing to pay five dollars to post-
pone the decision until the following day when they would know the
results of the examination.4" The fact that students (i) are unwilling to
commit to the vacation when there are still two uncertain possibilities
before them, namely, pass or fail the examination, but (ii) will choose
the vacation in the event that either one of these two possibilities be-
comes a certainty, illustrates the disjunction effect and violates the
sure thing principle.
36 See, e.g., Shafir et al., supra note 19, at 612-13 ("Evidently, a disjunction of differ-
ent reasons (reward in case of success or consolation in case of failure) is often less
compelling than either definite reason alone."); Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Thinking
Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449,
449 (1992) (explaining that "[u]ncertain situations may be thought of as disjunctions
of possible states").
37 Shafir et al., supra note 19, at 611.
38 Id. at 612.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 611.
20031 1185
1186 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWJE VIEW [Vol. 151:1169
The explanation that is offered for this behavior concerns the rea-
sons that the students give for wanting to go on the vacation in each of
the possible states of the world. When the student knows that she has
passed the exam, she reasons that the vacation is a just reward for her
success; when the student fails, she construes the vacation as providing
some kind of consolation. Thus, whatever the outcome of the exami-
nation, the student has a good reason-albeit a different reason for
each possible outcome-to take the vacation. However, when the
outcome of the examination is unknown, the student lacks either one
of these as "a definite reason, 42 for taking the vacation. Thus, under
this last scenario, it is as if she knows it is right for her to go on vaca-
tion, but not that it is right for any particular reason. This, somehow,
makes it hard for her to go.
We could also interpret her difficulty in the following way: when
she knows the outcome of the examination, she knows the reason that
is relevant to her choice and, therefore, she knows exactly what it is
that she is doing when she goes on vacation. When she knows she has
passed, for example, she knows that this is a "reward trip." Likewise,
when she knows that she has failed, she knows that this is a "consola-
tion trip." In other words, she can organize what she is doing under
some kind of category or understanding. But when she does not
know the results of the examination, it is as if her vacation lacks any
such identity, or meaning, for her. Again, it is as if she knows what
she should do (after all, she knows that she has no reason to do oth-
erwise), but she lacks any particular understanding of what it is that
she is doing when she does it. To the extent that such an understand-
ing might bring order, or rationality, to the particularity of what she
does, her reluctance to go, far from manifesting irrationality (as sug-
gested by the violation of the sure thing principle), evidences the im-
portance of this alternative conception of rationality for her behavior.
Indeed, without this alternative rationality to bring order to what she
does, she will pay five dollars to wait the one day so that she will know
what it is that she is doing. And she will do this despite the fact that
waiting the extra day will not change what she will do.
The vacation example suggests the importance for choice of hav-
ing an understanding of what it is that one is doing, as opposed to
having no such understanding at all (or, at least, an ambiguous or
equivocal understanding because of uncertainty). However, other ex-
periments reveal that the presence of uncertainty, giving rise to a dis-
42 Id. at 612.
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junction effect, can generate, more positively, an alternative under-
standing to that arising from choice under certainty and, therefore,
give rise to choices that violate the sure thing principle because there
is this different understanding informing choice. Consider, for ex-
ample, what Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky unearthed about how sub-
jects play the familiar two person prisoner's dilemma game . In their
experiment the rate of cooperation in the game was 3% when the sub-
jects knew that the other player had defected, and 16% when they
knew that the other player had cooperated.44 Now one might well
have expected some rate of cooperation between 3% and 16% when
the subjects were uncertain whether the other player had cooperated
or not. However, when the subjects were confronted with this uncer-
tain situation, the rate of cooperation rose significantly to 3 7 %,4" a
number that cannot be explained as some weighted average between
the strategy "cooperate when the other cooperates" and the strategy
"do not cooperate when the other does not."
Shafir and Tversky attribute this pattern of responses, a pattern
that shows the disjunction effect and violates the sure thing principle,
to the different understandings that a subject will have of her choice
situation depending on whether she knows if the other player has al-
ready made his choice of strategy.46 When she knows that the other
player has already chosen his strategy, whether it be to cooperate or
not to cooperate, the subject thinks of herself as acting "on her own. 
7
Given the choice of the other player, she alone will determine the final
outcome of the game. This encourages her to bring a highly indi-
vidualistic perspective to bear on her choice of strategy, a perspective
that leads her more naturally to choose against cooperation. How-
ever, in the disjunctive or uncertain situation, all four possible cells of
the prisoner's dilemma game are still very much in play, with the out-
come of the game still to be determined by a combination of the
strategy choices of both players taken together. Shafir and Tversky
argue that this provides for a more collective understanding of the
situation, and from this more collective point of view the optimal
43 Shafir & Tversky, supra note 36, at 452-59.
44 Id. at 454-55. The higher rate of cooperation in the latter situation provides
some support for the idea that players will sometimes reciprocate cooperation from
the other player rather than always choose the dominant noncooperation strategy that
rational choice theory typically prescribes.
45 Id. at 455.
46 Id. at 457.
47 Id.
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strategy for both parties is to cooperate. 48 Thus, it is less surprising
that cooperation is chosen more frequently in this situation, say Shafir
and Tversky, the sure thing principle notwithstanding.
4
9
It is worth emphasizing, again, that these differences in under-
standing that the subject brings to her choice situation cannot be ex-
plained on the basis of some variation in the properties or values of
any one (or more) of the alternative outcomes considered each on
their own. Nor are they to be explained by variations in properties or
values of the outcomes as weighted by the probability of their occur-
rence. Rather, the differences in understanding arise because the
same alternatives are somehow "differently conceived" depending on
what else is available, something that goes to a relationship that exists
between alternatives in the set of possibilities. For example, in the dis-
junctive case of the prisoner's dilemma, the presence of all four cells
together as possible outcomes of the game helps to frame any one of
them as instances of the "still-to-be-collectively-determined" category.
On the other hand, when only two cells within a given column of the
game are available (indicating that the other player has already cho-
sen his strategy), the two possible outcomes become instances of the
"it's-all-up-to-me" category. The idea that there could be a relation-
ship between alternative outcomes, related as instances of a particu-
larly conceived category of possibilities, and that this could influence an
individual's choice of a strategy producing those outcomes, is an idea
that the independence properties in the sure thing principle are set to
deny.!"
48 d.
49 Id. at 457-58. Someone might object that there is a better explanation for the
subjects' tendency to choose "less rationally" (in the sense that rational choice would
require that the subject choose the dominant noncooperative strategy) in the case
where the four possible cells of the prisoner's dilemma are still in play. The argument
might he that choosing over four cells is a more complex choice than choosing over
two cells, and that it should not be surprising that subjects do less well, or less "ration-
ally," in the more complex case. However, Rachel Croson has experimental results
that show this cannot be the explanation; it appears that the disjunction effect disap-
pears in games that are equally complex but which do not have the same scope for dif-
ferent reasons. See Rachel T.A. Croson, The Disjunction Effect and Reason-Based Choice in
Games, 80 ORG'L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 118, 129-31 (1999) (testing an
alternative theory of decision making, complexity, as an explanation of the disjunction
effect). Thus, Croson concludes that the explanation for the effect is reason-based,
not complexity-based. Id. at 131.
50 The famous Allais paradox can be thought of in the same way. Maurice Allais,
The Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving Risk and a Criticism of the Postulates
and Axioms of the American School, in EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESES AND THE ALLAIS
PARADOX 27 (Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen eds., 1979). Allais argued that agents often
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III. REASON-BASED CHOICE AND THE LAW
The common law is more than a mere collection of authoritative
resolutions for disputes. In addition to providing a decision, common
law judges are typically expected to articulate a set of publicly com-
prehensible reasons in support of the decision. Indeed, the obliga-
tion to provide reasons for one's choices may well be the one thing
that effectively distinguishes the common law as a method of collective
decision making. In market or political forms of decision making, for
example, individual rights holders and legislators can make perfectly
authoritative decisions without good reason." But, in the common
law, the reasons that are publicly articulated in support of some deci-
sion form a large part of the authoritative basis for it. Weak reasoning
will undermine the authority of a case and leave it exposed to the in-
dignity of being distinguished into oblivion, if not completely over-
turned or reversed.
This suggests that common law adjudication is very self-
consciously a form of reason-based choice. It remains to be seen,
however, whether we can find the same tension in law between reason-
based choice and value-based choice that we saw above in the behav-
iorists' experiments. In this Part, I will argue that the same tension
does exist, and that it is often properly resolved in favor of legal rea-
sons that, for groups of judges, can be sensibly organized under par-
ticular categories of understanding, the sort of thing that explained
the behavior of the experimental subjects discussed earlier. This ra-
tional ordering of particular decision making is something I call cate-
gorical reason.
will have a "certainty preference" that cannot be allowed for if the strong independ-
ence condition, or sure thing principle, of expected utility theory is assumed. The cer-
tainty of getting some given payoff in every possible state of nature is not a property of
any one state of nature. Rather, it is a property of, or a property of how we think of, all
the (mutually exclusive) alternative states taken as a whole, that is, a property of their
relationship. Moreover, because the alternative states are mutually exclusive possibili-
ties, their relationship cannot be causal, only conceptual.
51I do not mean to suggest that the passage of legislation is never informed by
reasoned debate. Indeed, for the "republican" theory of politics, this sort of delibera-
tive exchange is often thought to be central and important for grounding the authority
of political decision making in general. I only mean to argue that the authority of any
given legislative act is, ultimately, a matter of its proper positing by some legitimate
lawmaker (e.g., a majority of the legislators). It is not affected by the possibility that,
after reasoned debate, the particular reasons that prevailed were not especially good.
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To see the connection between law and reason-based choice as
understood by the behaviorists, consider the following example:1
2
Suppose that a plaintiff was injured while using some product and that
she has advanced two separate and independent claims for the recov-
ery of damages from the defendant manufacturer. The plaintiff has
argued that the product was either defectively manufactured (D) or
sold with an inadequate warning (W), where either of these two argu-
ments would be sufficient, if successful, to win a judgment (j) for the
damages in question. In symbols, (D or W)---J. Now suppose that a
panel of three judges has considered the various arguments and that
each judge has come out on the issues in the following way. Judge A
52 The example is an instance, in disjunctive form, of what Lewis Kornhauser and
Lawrence Sager originally called "the doctrinal paradox." Lewis A. Kornhauser & Law-
rence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1,
3, 57 (1993); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 114-15 (1986) (illustrating the problem of the doctrinal paradox); Lewis
A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases 2 (Nov. 26,
2001) [hereinafter Kornhauser & Sager, Group Choice] (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (defining paradoxical cases as those "where a group's consensus on
underlying premises diverges from that group's consensus on the ultimate outcome").
For other discussions of the doctrinal paradox, including analyses that link it to more
general problems in the theory of social choice and the theory of games, see Geoffrey
Brennan, Collective Coherence?, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 197, 200-01 (2001) (examining
the doctrinal paradox and illustrating how justice may conflict with doctrine); Bruce
Chapman, More Easily Done Than Said: Rules, Reasons and Rational Social Choice, 18
OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 293, 312-18 (1998) [hereinafter Chapman, More Easily Done]
(analyzing reasons, legal issues, and structure-based equilibrium); Bruce Chapman,
Rational Aggregation, I POL., PHIL. & ECON. 337, 341-50 (2002) [hereinafter Chapman,
RationalAggregation] (arguing that the aggregation of reasoned individual judgments is less
subject to paradox than the aggregation of individual preferences); Bruce Chapman, Ra-
tionally Transparent Social Interactions, in COGNITION, RATIONALIlY, AND INSTITUTIONs 189,
197-98 (Manfred E. Streit et al. eds., 2000) (using a legal example to illustrate the point
that some strategic interactions are transparent simply because they are more rationally
comprehensible); Christian List & Philip Pettit, Aggregating Sets ofJudgments: An Impossi-
bility Result, 18 ECON. & PHIL. 89, 96-100 (2002) (proving a general impossibility theo-
rem for the aggregation of individual judgments); Christian List & Philip Pettit, Aggre-
gating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared, SYNTHIESE (forthcoming
2003) (manuscript at 10-12, on file with author) (comparing Arrow's impossibility
theorem with their own impossibility result), available at http://socpol.anu.edu.au/
pdf-files/W20.pdf; Philip Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma, in
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 268, 274-76 (Philosophical Issues vol. 11,
Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva eds., 2001); Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of
Their Own 1-4 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing
the doctrinal paradox in the context of purposive groups more generally), available at
http://socpol.anu.edu.au/pdf-files/W12.pdf. Saul Levmore used the specific example
in the text, involving two different causes of action, to make a quite different point
about the conjunction of probabilities. See Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation,
99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 729 n.11 (2001) (identifying a "reverse conjunction" problem in
the context of the product rule combining independent probabilities).
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believes that there is no reason for thinking that the product was
defectively manufactured. Thus, she believes argument D to be false.
But she thinks argument W is true; in other words, she thinks that, al-
though the product has not been defectively manufactured, there is
some risk and the consumer has been inadequately warned. She
would find reason forJ on the basis of W Judge B, on the other hand,
believes that, while adequate information has been provided and,
therefore, that argument W is false, the product has, nevertheless,
been defectively manufactured and, therefore, that argument D is
true. Thus, she too would find in favor of J, albeit for a reason differ-
ent fromJudge A. Finally,Judge C rejects both arguments D and Was
false and, therefore, also rejects J as false. The views of the three dif-
ferentjudges are presented in summary form in Table 1.
Table 1
3. There should
1. There should 2. There should bereson
beJ for reason D. beJ for reason W. beJ for reasonD or W.
Judge A False True True
Judge B True False True
Judge C False False False
Majority False False True
Were:
J is the proposition, "The plaintiff wins ajudgment for damages."
D is the proposition, "The product was defectively manufactured."
W is the proposition, "There was an inadequate warning of product
risks."
And: (D or W)--*J.
It should be apparent that, at the group level, there is something
odd going on here. A majority of the court rejects proposition 1,
"There should be J for reason D," as false. Further, a majority of the
court also rejects proposition 2, "There should be J for reason W," as
false. Yet, a majority of the court accepts the disjunctive proposition
3, "There should be J for reason D or W," as true. There is something
collectively irrational in this combination of votes. At the group level,
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it looks like we have generated a disjunction effect similar to what we
observed earlier in the behaviorist experiments.
The collective irrationality would become particularly apparent if
the majority of judges who support an outcome favoring the plaintiff,
A and B, had to articulate a set of publicly comprehensible reasons in
support of their decision. There are, after all, only two possible ar-
guments that the plaintiff can make in this case to win a reward for
damages J. Yet, on each of these essential arguments, the two judges
who form a majority in favor of the plaintiff have completely opposing
views (as indicated by columns 1 and 2). They would, therefore, have
some difficulty saying together what it is that they want to do together.
The two judges may share a common preference, or predisposition,
for the outcome favoring the plaintiff, but it is not at all clear that they
have a shared understanding of what it is that they are doing to reach
that outcome. 3 It is as if what they want to do together lacks any real
categorical identity. Nor is the problem merely that there is a plurality
of reasons here, with no particular reason commanding majority sup-
port. There are majority views on each of the relevant reasons and
they are that neither D nor W is a good reason for the plaintiff to pre-
vail in this action.
Now one might ask whether this lack of any common understand-
ing of, or reason for, a shared preference for a particular legal out-
come must translate into any practical difficulty for the majority actu-
ally to act on its preference, that is, whether the failure to be able to
articulate a common sense of what it is that one is doing should im-
pact at all on the possibility of rational choice .5 4 In some strictly causal
53 Of course, eachjudge has a reason for what she wants to do. To that extent, the
position of each judge is reasoned and not merely a matter of preference or predispo-
sition. But as these reasons are not shared between the judges, what is shared, not be-
ing supported by reason, looks more like a brute preference or predisposition.
54 If the different members of a majority are voting in favor of a given outcome,
but each for different reasons, then in an important sense they are not actually voting
on the same proposition. For example, in Table 1, column 3, while it appears that
Judges A and B agree in their voting, Judge A is actually voting for the proposition ']
for reason W," whereas Judge B is voting for the proposition 'J for reason D." This se-
verely complicates the epistemic support that majority voting gives to a given proposi-
tion by way of Condorcet's famous jury theorem. Condorcet's theorem shows that if
each member of a group of voters is more likely to be right than wrong about some
given proposition (and this probability of being right is more or less equal for each
voter), then a majority of such voters is even more likely to be right than wrong about
that proposition than is any of the voters alone. MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ESSAY ON
THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING (Paris,
L'imprimerie Royale 1785), reprinted in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33, 48-49
(Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976); see Bernard Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search
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sense, of course, there cannot be any such impact. It is always possible
to pursue one's preferences without good reasons, and possible for a
majority to pursue its preferences without any coherent reason across
its members. The preferred alternative is not less available as an op-
portunity for choice simply because the majority cannot organize its
thinking in favor of that preferred result under a single (coherent) set
of concepts or categories of thought. Thus, at first glance there is lit-
tle in this legal example, perhaps, that provides any reason for think-
ing that there is some necessary connection between what we can say
or think (together) and what we can do (together). The conventions
of rational choice theory, therefore, which emphasize (as WARP does)
consistency of choice over the consistent availability of unchanging al-
ternatives, seem not to be much affected, although one might have
hoped that the idea that one can pursue one's preferences without
good reasons would give a rational decision theorist some reason to
pause.
However, the experimental results provided by the behaviorists55
do suggest that subjects will have some difficulty making a choice (or
making the same choice) if they cannot organize what they want to do
under a set of particular (or the same set of particular) reasons. Thus,
this literature supports the idea that there can be a genuine tension
between what we want to do and what we have reason to do, and that
this tension is often resolved, as a matter of fact, in favor of reason.
Further, it seems that our legal practices might provide some
normative support for resolving the tension in this way. For suppose
the plaintiff in the Table 1 example were to argue that she should win
ajudgmentJ because there appears to be a majority agreement in fa-
vor of this outcome in column 3. In other words, she points simply
and bluntly to the fact that a majority of the judges thinks that she
should win, albeit for different reasons. A lawyer is tempted to reply, I
think, that the plaintiff's appeal to the column 3 agreement is inade-
of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 264-65 (1983) (formalizing and extending
Condorcet's original jury theorem). The theorem provides some reason for using ma-
jority voting in legal decision making to get at matters that have a correct legal answer,
or are questions ofjudgment rather than preference, but it is crucial for the applica-
tion of the theorem that the relevant majorities have voted for the same, or at least not
inconsistent, propositions. Thus, in the context of the doctrinal paradox, this means
that the Condorcet theorem may provide more epistemic support for the majority
votes down columns I and 2 than it does for the majority vote down column 3. For
further discussion of the relevance of the doctrinal paradox to the application of the
Condorcet theorem, see Chapman, Rational Aggregation, supra note 52, at 341-44.
55 See supra text accompanying notes 37-49 (discussing the results of Shafir, Simon-
son, and Tversky concerning the idea of "reason-based choice").
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quate because in law she has an obligation to frame her claim against
the defendant as an argument, that is, tinder some sort of conceptual
structure. It will not do for the plaintiff to show only that a majority of
the judges believes (in some unstructured way) that the defendant
owes (or, even, probably owes) her damages for some reason. Instead,
she must show that (more probably than not) a majority of the judges
believes that there is a reason-at least one particular reason, here
woven out of some particular account of transactional wrong-for the
claim. It is in this respect that some claims, even if they are right (or
right more probably than not), may not be right for the right reasons.
We might reasonably wonder, therefore, whether they are both right
and rational.
IV. CATEGORICAL REASON AND RATIONAL CHOICE
The argument so far has shown that there is an alternative con-
ception of ideally rational choice, which I have called categorical rea-
son, that requires us to relax some quite fundamental axioms of the
economic theory of rational choice. If agents choose under an under-
standing of what it is that they are doing, and not merely in a goal- or
value-oriented way, then they will choose differently under different
understandings, the requirements of WARP and the sure thing prin-
ciple notwithstanding. I have called this alternative conception of ra-
tional choice categorical reason because it emphasizes the idea that a
relationship between certain alternatives, or how they are understood
together or as a category, can inform choice. In this respect, categori-
cal reason is to be contrasted with axioms like WARP and the sure
thing principle, which emphasize the independent properties and
values of particular alternatives, and insist on choice consistency so
long as these properties, independently considered (either within a
set of certain alternatives or within a lottery of uncertain outcomes),
remain the same.
Further, the research done by the behaviorists has suggested that,
as a matter of fact, this alternative ideal of rational choice does inform
how agents actually choose. Of course, the particular experiments
might still have us wondering how rational it is merely to react (un-
thinkingly) to some of these different understandings of one's choice
situation. For example, to choose a higher quality pen over some cash
merely because a lesser quality pen has been added to the set of alter-
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natives5" does not seem to be a particularly rational thing to do on any
plausible account of rationality. However, I have argued that different
scenarios can easily be constructed that make perfect sense of this sort
of behavior and, further, that the practice of common law adjudica-
tion, in its traditional emphasis on the obligation to offer a particular
argument in support of one's claim, idealizes a form of categorical
reason.
In this Part, I argue that there is some advantage in this alternative
conception of rationality, even for what the economic theorist of ra-
tional choice seeks to accomplish. I focus on two areas of rational
choice theory that have confronted systematic difficulties, namely, the
theory of social choice and the theory of games, to suggest how the
arguments might go. In the theory of social choice I suggest that the
idea of categorical reason can bring some conceptual discipline to
bear on the individual preferences that are deemed admissible into
the social choice rule and that certain problems of instability in social
choice can thereby be avoided. I relate this argument to certain for-
mal results in social choice theory dealing with required restrictions
on the domain of admissible preferences. In the theory of games, I
argue that categorical reason allows a player to conceive of the game
she is playing in a way that makes certain strategy choices less accessi-
ble to her. The result, I suggest, is a greater propensity for players to
coordinate their choices in a coordination game and, more controver-
sially, a greater propensity for them to choose cooperatively in the
prisoner's dilemma game.
A. Categorical Reason and Social Choice
In many situations calling for collective action, it seems likely that
the individual members of a decisive majority will not have reasons in
common for what they most want to do. Yet we will not feel that this is
in any way problematic for them. Consider, for example, that most
mundane of economic transactions, the purchase of a car. To give
this problem a collective dimension, imagine that there is a three-
person purchasing consortium and that a majority of the consortium
has voted to buy a white sports car. One member of the majority has
voted this way only because the car is white and the other only because
it is a sports car. Table 2 summarizes this scenario in a way that ap-
56 This choice is discussed supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
57 See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, Group Choice, supra note 52, at 18-20 (discussing
the different normative premises that might motivate individual members of a group).
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pears to make it fully analogous to the earlier legal example laid out
in Table 1.
Table 2
3. We should buy
1. We should buy 2. We should buy this car because it
this car because it this car because it is a w eate s 
t
is white. is a sports car.
car.
Individual A True False True
Individual B False True True
Individual C False False False
Majority False False True
The fact that the members A and B of the majority in column 3 do
not have "reasons in common" to support their shared preference for
buying this particular car is not thought to present them with any real
difficulty. Nor is it thought to be rationally compelling that this pur-
chasing consortium chooses not to buy this white sports car simply be-
cause a majority rejects both the idea of buying it because it is white
and the idea of buying it because it is a sports car. The decision to
purchase a car, even (more particularly) a white sports car, is not es-
sentially decomposable into two prior atomic propositions: Is it a
sports car? Is it white? That underlying structure, while possibly a
helpful guide to the purchasing decision, is not an essential part of
the problem in the same way that the plaintiffs claim to damages in
Table 1 needs to be grounded in a particular account of transactional
wrong. Rather, the purchasing consortium is out to purchase a car,
perhaps even the best car that is available to it, all things considered. But
that judgment is ultimately made of the car and on the whole, not on a
criterion-by-criterion (or column-by-column) basis.
Despite this structural difference in the examples, there might be
something useful, even for what the economist seeks to accomplish by
way of social choice or what a purchasing consortium seeks to achieve
in the market for cars, in insisting on the greater rationality require-
ment that is inherent in the legal idea that members of a group can
act sensibly together only if they can organize what they would prefer
to do under a common understanding, that is, only if they can act to-
gether under a common set of categories or concepts. That this is
sometimes difficult to do, and that it sometimes frustrates the
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achievement of shared preferences, might be precisely what is so use-
ful about it.
To illustrate this point, suppose that the three individuals in our
Table 2 purchasing consortium, considering the joint purchase of a
car, originally had preferences over three alternative cars as follows
(where for each individual the alternatives are preferred in order
from top to bottom within each column):
Table 3
Individual A Individual B Individual C
White sports car (WS) Black sports car (BS) Black family car (B1)
Black family car (BI) White sports car (WS) Black sports car (BS)
Black sports car (BS) Black family car (B) White sports car (WS)
This is, of course, the preference profile that makes for the familiar
majority voting paradox .5s A majority prefers WS to B, BF to BS, and
BS to WS. Thus, within the social choice framework, there is the dan-
ger here of a kind of excess of rational doing: for every alternative that
one is tempted to choose, there is another that a majority would pre-
fer to have instead. It is this excess of rational doing that gives rise to
cycling and instability.
Now it is common for economists to point out that the problem
here is that individual preferences are not "single peaked"; there is no
general agreement (1) that all the alternatives are to be assessed ac-
cording to some single decisive dimension, and (2) that one of the al-
ternatives is of intermediate value on that decisive dimension. If only
that were so, the argument goes, then that intermediately placed al-
ternative would never be the worst alternative for any voter and the
majority voting paradox would be avoided .
58 For a good introductory discussion of the majority voting paradox, see DENNIS
L. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 63-66 (1989).
5. Id. at 64-66. If there is this sort of agreement across the voters, and preferences
are single peaked, then the alternative chosen under majority rule will be the one
which possesses that amount of the decisive dimension which is most preferred by the
median voter-that is, the voter who is in the middle of the distribution of voters or-
dered along the decisive dimension according to where their most preferred alterna-
tive is on that decisive dimension. Why this alternative would be chosen, and why no
other alternative would defeat it under majority rule, can easily be appreciated in the
following way: Imagine beginning at the extreme left (or right) of the decisive contin-
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This is, in effect, to insist that individuals organize their prefer-
ences in a single-minded way along one decisive dimension and to al-
low them only the limited scope of ordering the social alternatives ac-
cording to how these alternatives vary quantitatively (more or less)
along that decisive dimension.6° But, as the example suggests, and as
multidimensional models show more generally,"' individuals react,
reasonably, to a broad range of categorically different dimensions or
aspects of the social alternatives on offer. And so the question arises
whether these different and plural dimensions of a social choice prob-
lem can be rationally organized in some way so that instability can be
avoided.
The car example is suggestive. The majority coalition of A and C
can say together (in support of what they might do together), "Given that
the car is black, we would prefer it to be a family car." Likewise, the
majority coalition of B and C might be able to say, "Given that it's a
sports car, we would prefer it to be black." In this respect, these coali-
tions can make use of what are sometimes referred to as generic prefer-
ences.(3 But what would the majority coalition A and B say together?
In some sense, of course, they have a shared preference over a pair of
very particularly described alternatives just like the other majority coa-
litions do. Indeed, as already intimated, that is what gives rise to the
instability. But their shared preference for WS over BF lacks any of
the generic structure that characterizes the shared preferences of the
other two majority coalitions. Thus, it is harder for them to articulate
their shared preference in any sort of categorical way, that is, in a way
that makes use of the generic preferences that are in play in the
choice problem. In this respect they, as a coalition, are rendered
uum. Then any move to the right (or left) will receive the support of a majority of the
voters until we arrive at the median voter's ideal position on the continuum, at which
point any further move to the right (or left) will be defeated by a majority of the voters.
The standard example is the ordering of candidates for political office from
"left" to "right" on the ideological spectrum. Another example might be the different
quantities of some uni-dimensional public good that different voters want to buy at a
given tax price. For a good discussion of both of these examples, see ALLAN FELDMAN,
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 169-70 (1980).
61 See Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and
Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472-82 (1976) (detailing
how multidimensional voting can "end tip at any other point in the space of alterna-
tives"). For a discussion of the multidimensional case in a legal context, see Chapman,
More Easily Done, supra note 52, at 300-16.
62 SeeJon Doyle & Richmond H. Thomason, Background to Qualitative Decision The-
oy, Al MAC., Summer 1999, at 55, 58 (defining generic preferences as preferences
among classes).
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"speechless," just like judges A and B were in the Table 1 legal exam-
ple. But now we can see that there may be some stabilizing effect in
using the discipline of a shared (or public) categorical reason to re-
strict the formation of this majority group. After all, without this addi-
tional discipline and structure, there is only a senseless (i.e., noncate-
gorical, nonconceptual) aggregation of (merely particular) pre-
ferences and the cycling problem that this permits.
The discipline that is provided by a (public) categorical reason
can be related more generally to a particular form of "value restric-
tion" (specifically, "not-between value restriction") that Amartya Sen
has shown is sufficient for avoiding the majority voting paradox.
Specifically, if all individuals agree that in any triple a given alternative
is "not between" the other two, that is, is either best or worst of the
three, then the majority voting paradox cannot occur. For instance,
in the car example, it is easy to see that an alternative way to express
what A and C have in common is their view that WS is a "not-between"
alternative for them; the real issue between them is whether the pur-
chased car should be a black car (BF, BS) or not (WS). Individual A
puts the white car alternative (WS) first and the pair of black car al-
ternatives (BF, BS) last, whereas individual C has the reverse ordering
of these two partitions. This is something that they could have de-
cided first, before they went on to decide, if necessary, what was a sec-
ondary issue to them, viz., what type of car a black car should be."
Likewise, what the coalition of B and C has in common might have
been expressed as an agreement over BF as a "not-between" alterna-
tive, the sort of agreement that asks each to decide first whether the
car chosen should be a sports car or not and, second, if it should be a
sports car, whether it should be black or white. But, again, the pair of
individuals A and B would have some difficulty articulating its own ver-
sion of a common understanding of the relevant issues in this way.
They agree between them that BS is a "not-between" alternative, but
63 Amartya K. Sen, A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions, 34 ECONOMETRICA
491, 492-95 (1966).
64 It could be, of course, that A feels there is a great deal more at stake in the
choice of car type than the choice of color, viz., that the preferential distance between
BFand BS is large compared to the preferential distance between WS and BE. But this
cannot be a view that she has in common with C. For C the preferential distance be-
tween BF and BS is contained within the distance between BF and WS. So the search for
a shared (or public) categorical reason for choice, at least one linking A and C, cannot be
found here. As the text following this note suggests, this suggested interpretation (that
car type is a more important issue than car color) is better for the pair of voters B and
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what, exactly, is the category or concept that embraces the partition
(WS, BF) of alternatives that is the complement to that not-between
alternative? The problem, again, is that it is hard to "make sense" of
such a partition of the alternatives in terms of the categories or con-
cepts (color and type of car) that are in play in the example. We
might say, as we can for all the other possible pairs of individuals, that
individuals A and B agree at the level of preferences, but that they do
not share any sort of categorical agreement about the sorts of issues
that inform their choice and the order in which these issues might be
considered.
Now one might object that the imposition of a categorical disci-
pline on preferences still leaves too much unresolved to be helpful.
After all, even those two groups of voters, AC and BC, which (unlike
group AB) agree that the salient issues are the type and color of the
car to be purchased, disagree fundamentally on the order in which
these two issues should be addressed. For AC the most salient issue is
color; only after considering that issue would this group turn its atten-
tion, if necessary, to what type of car it should be. But for the coali-
tion BC the most important issue is type of car, and only if a sports car
is chosen would the coalition turn its attention to the issue of color.
Moreover, the order in which the issues are considered is likely to af-
fect the outcome; in this respect the matter is analogous to the prob-
lem of path-dependent choice.65 For example, if color is considered
first, then it seems less likely that BS will end up being chosen. Indi-
(5 The choice of an alternative is path-dependent if the probability of that alterna-
tive being chosen varies with the order in which it is presented for consideration as
compared to other alternatives. In social choice theory, the conventional view is to
think of path dependence as a kind of arbitrariness to be avoided; alternatives should
be chosen, the argument goes, according to the value of their intrinsic properties.
Kenneth Arrow, for example, defended his use of a collective rationality condition in
social choice on the ground that collective rationality, in the form of a fully transitive
social preference relation, would guarantee path independence. KENNETHJ. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 120 (2d ed. 1963); see also Charles R. Plott,
Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice, 41 ECONOMETRICA 1075, 1075-91 (1973)
(discussing the relationship between path dependence and collective rationality).
However, not all path dependence should be construed as arbitrary path dependence;
some choice sequences, or paths, might make "more sense" than others and will often
matter a great deal to a process theorist. See Bruce Chapman, Individual Rights and Col-
lective Rationality: Some Implications for Economic Analysis of Law, 10 HOFsTRA L. REV. 455,
466-70 (1982) (reconciling path dependence with deontological thought); Chapman,
More Easily Done, supra note 52, at 303 (arguing that "some legal choice paths or proc-
esses are so permeated by thought," and so conceptually privileged, that they make
choosing on alternative choice paths almost "unthinkable"); Bruce Chapman, Rights as
Constraints: Nozick Versus Sen, 15 THEORY& DECISION 1, 2-8 (1983) (discussing the im-
plications of rightful choice partitions for collective rationality).
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vidual C will vote in favor of black cars, and individual A against black
cars, in the first round. Whether black cars are chosen categorically in
that round depends a good deal on how individual B, whose prefer-
ences are not categorical in this way because they do not satisfy not-
between value restriction on alternative WS, actually votes. But, in the
event of a first round vote for a black car, it does seem likely that BF
will defeat BS in the vote on the issue of type of car. An analogous ar-
gument would suggest that WS is the less likely choice if the issue of
type of car is decided first.
However, in some contexts, there is good reason to think that this
sort of path dependence will be less of a problem for categorically
sensitive choice. 6 This is because the categories or concepts that
make sense of certain partitions of the alternatives for choice will often
make sense of certain paths (or sequences of those partitions) as well,
at least if we want to continue to make use of the stabilizing effects of
not-between value restriction. To see this, consider the example of a
criminal trial, where the two issues to be decided are the verdict and
the sentence for the accused. Again, one could imagine a panel of
judges considering three possible final outcomes-innocent (I), guilty
with a severe sentence (GS), and guilty with a lenient sentence (GL).
And again, a natural partition of the alternative outcomes might be
into the two issues, verdict (generating the choice "(1) or (GS, GL)?")
and sentence (generating the choice "GS or GL?"), a partitioning that
would "make sense" in a way that the alternative partitions, "(GS) or
(I, GL)?" or "(GL) or (I, GS)?," would not. (What single concept,
category, or issue sensibly comprehends the partition (I, GS), for ex-
ample?) But, still, it seems that one could take these two issues, and
the partitions to which they lend sense, in order of either "sentence
first, verdict afterwards" or "verdict first, sentence afterwards." The
law adopts the second of the two possibilities (and the Queen at Al-
ice's trial in Wonderland adopts the first),67 but is there any reason to
do so? One answer, of course, is simple economy: why bother attend-
ing to the issue of sentencing until we know that the verdict decision
makes it necessary? But the analysis provided here suggests a different
answer. While both sequences respect the partition of the alternatives
that makes the most sense, only the path that has us consider the ver-
66 See Chapman, supra note 27, at 1507 (arguing that law exemplifies a "categorical
application of plural considerations to decisionmaking" by using a "process of adjudi-
cation as sequenced argument").
67 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 187 (Univ. Microfilms
1966) (1865).
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dict first, or the one forcing the initial choice to be over the partitions
"(I) or (GS, GL)," imposes any sort of not-between value restriction on
the panel of judges. Under the verdict first sequence, each judge
must order her preferences around the salient legal categories, decid-
ing whether to put the alternative I either better or worse than (but
not between) the alternatives GS or GL. The sentence first sequence,
on the other hand, while paying a kind of lip service to the same set of
issues, does not require any of the judges to order her preferences
around those issues. For example, a judge who preferred the three
alternatives in the order GL first, then I, and then GS, that is, someone
who might be saying, "Whether or not I would find him guilty of the
offense depends on the sentence he would receive," would have no
difficulty voting these preferences under the sentence first procedure
even though these preferences do not seem to show a categorical
commitment to the issues that are salient in the case. The verdict first
sequence, on the other hand, does force this judge to ask a more cate-
gorical sort of question about the verdict, that is, to show the same
sort of commitment to the issues in the case as does the law she per-
sonifies."s Furthermore, under a verdict first procedure, we not only
make sense of the issues in the case, but we also impose a domain re-
striction on the preferences that legal decision makers can bring to
bear on legal decisions so that certain problems of instability are
avoided.
The burden of this Section has been to show that categorical rea-
son can provide a useful sort of conceptual discipline on the kinds of
shared individual preferences that should be decisive in social choice.
Certain individuals, who want to do something together, might find
that it is more difficult to act as a decisive coalition in favor of their
shared preferences if they are obliged to think, and talk, about exactly
68 Requiring this sort of structure can, of course, tempt the judge to "nullify" a
possible guilty verdict for fear of risking the worst (for her) possible sentencing out-
come GS. Verdict nullification has attracted a good deal of critical comment, particu-
larly in the United States where, injury trials, there is the possibility of the death pen-
alty. Juries are said to be charged with the responsibility of reaching a verdict within
the law as explained by the trial judge; it is the task of the judge to determine the sen-
tence. For members of the jury to worry about the sentence rather than the verdict,
particularly if they think the accused has committed the offense in question, is thought
by some to violate the rule of law. Whatever the merits of verdict nullification byju-
ries, my analysis here, based on the stabilizing impact of imposing the categorical con-
straints of not-between value restriction, offers an independent reason for supporting
the verdict first procedure. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Jiuy Nullification Within the
Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (1997) (examiningjury nullification and sug-
gesting thatjury nullification can "occur within the rule of law, rather than subvert it").
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what it is that they are doing. To the extent that the problems of in-
stability that arise in social choice are explained in large part because
too many decisive coalitions can form too easily, the conceptual disci-
pline that categorical reason provides in this respect could be very
helpful. I have also tried to relate the idea of categorical reason to
some well-known results in the theory of social choice that impose re-
strictions on the domain of individual preferences that can be admit-
ted into social choice if instability is to be avoided. While the latter
results are not in any way new for the economic theory of social
choice, it is novel to motivate these results in, and connect them to,
the more philosophical idea of categorical reason. I now will suggest
that categorical reason can also have a beneficial impact on the possi-
bility of coordination and cooperation in the theory of games.
B. Categorical Reason in Noncooperative Games
Consider the simple two person pure coordination game called
"Heads and Tails."69 Each person, without consulting the other, must
turn up either "Heads" or "Tails" on her own coin. If each person
turns up "Tails"-a match-then each will win five dollars from the
pot. However, if each turns up "Heads"-another match-then each
will win ten dollars from the pot. In the absence of a match, each wins
nothing. What should each person do? What is the rational thing to
do?
Note that there is no conflict of interest in this game. The two
players will receive identical payoffs in all four possible outcomes and,
70
therefore, order these four outcomes in an identical way. Specifi-
cally, they both agree that the outcome generated by each of them
playing "Heads" is best, that the outcome wherein each plays "Tails" is
69 This game is discussed in Sugden, supra note 32, at 775.
70 Thus, this could be a game in which all the players are act utilitarians: each
seeks to act in such a way that total welfare for her society is maximized, but must do so
without the benefit of prior consultation about what she should do to achieve that
shared goal. Such a group has a coordination problem (the inability to communicate
is what makes the game "noncooperative"), even though there is an identity of inter-
ests across the players. See D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM: A
STUDY IN NORMATIVE ETHICS AND LEGAL THEORY 58-62 (1967) (illustrating that even
correct application of act utilitarianism would not necessarily have better conse-
quences, and would possibly have worse consequences, than would acceptance of spe-
cific conventional moral rules and personal rules); DONALD REGAN, UTILITARIANISM
AND CO-OPERATION 66 (1980) (analyzing the problem of coordination between act
utilitarians). For a good introductory discussion showing how rational choice theory
implies counterintuitive results in the analysis of coordination games, see Sugden, su-
pra note 32, at 774-78.
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second best, and that the two non-matching outcomes, "Heads-Tails"
and "Tails-Heads," are tied for worst. One might have thought that
this would make the choice of actions relatively easy: each player
would choose that action, "Heads," which so clearly, and without con-
flict, makes both players better off.
Surprisingly, however, the choice of this action is less obvious for a
player deemed to be rational in the way that rationality is understood
within game theory. This is because rational play for any one player
depends crucially on what that player thinks the other player will do
in the game. It is simply false, the argument goes, to think that one
should always turn up "Heads." If the other player turns up "Heads,"
then, but only then, should the first player match with "Heads" her-
self. Otherwise, the first player should turn tip "Tails" and secure the
second best of the matching outcomes. The problem, of course, is
that both players are thinking through this same problem of strategic
choice at the same time (or, at least, without prior consultation or
revelation of their choices), and so neither can really condition her
choice on the given choice of the other. Moreover, that each player is
rational in this way is typically assumed to be common knowledge in
the game." Thus, each player knows that the other is likewise at-
tempting to work out this conditional strategy which conditions on a
strategy that is itself conditional on the strategy of the first. The result
is an infinite (self-referential) regress that has the effect of leaving
each player in a kind of strategic limbo, unsure about what to do.
Nor do the difficulties disappear if we allow the individual player
to develop a strategy that appears to recognize and confront this prob-
lem as one of uncertainty. The mixed (or probabilistic) strategy that
survives the common knowledge assumption requires that each player
play "Heads" with a 1/3 probability and "Tails" with a 2/3 probabil-
ity.72 However, while this allows both players simultaneously to step
71 Common knowledge is information which is known to all the players in a game,
which each player knows the others know, which each knows the others know that she
knows, and so on. Common knowledge of rationality (and of the rules and payoffs of
the game) is typically crucial for solving games because it allows players to put them-
selves in the place of other players, to replicate their reasoning (that is, think through
what they will rationally do in their situation), and act accordingly. For a discussion of
the importance of the common knowledge assumption to game theory, see CRISTINA
BICciiIERI, RATIONALITY AND COORDINATION 39-43 (1993); Chapman, supra note 30, at
443-45.
72 This is the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy. "A Nash equilibrium is an array of
strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an incentive (in terms of im-
proving his own payoff) to deviate from his part of the strategy array." DAVID M.
KREPs, GAME THEORYAND ECONOMIC MODELLING 28 (1990). Any other assignment of
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out of the strategic limbo in which they originally found themselves,
the consequence is hardly comforting. Now, under this choice of a
mixed strategy by each player, the most preferred outcome where
each player matches on "Heads" arises with only a 1/9 probability (the
product of each player independently playing heads with a 1/3 prob-
ability). One might have hoped that rational choice would do better
than that.
The economist Michael Bacharach has characterized the sort of
thinking that generates this difficulty as thinking in an "I/he" frame.73
The "I/he" frame accommodates the idea, central to game theory and
Nash-like thinking, that a player should ask what strategy is best for
herself given what the other player might do, and allows that player,
again under common knowledge of such reasoning, to replicate that
probabilities between the two choices, "Heads" and "Tails," would not be stable as each
of the two players tested out its rationality under common knowledge, an assumption
that allows each to replicate the reasoning of the other and then make corresponding
adjustments in a proposed strategy choice.
For an explanation of how to derive (and interpret) a mixed strategy, see ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 69-73
(1989). Mixed strategies require an odd interpretation. The idea is to calculate the
probability distribution over one's own possible actions such that the other player will
be, indifferent between which strategy she chooses. Thus, in the game "Heads and
Tails," if player 1 chooses to play "Heads" with a 1/3 probability, the expected payoff
for player 2 in playing "Heads" is equal to the expected payoff in playing "Tails,"
namely, 10/3. But given her indifference between playing either of the two pure
strategies (i.e., either "Heads" or "Tails" with certainty) in such circumstances, she
should also be indifferent between playing either of those pure strategies and any
mixed strategy which combines them probabilistically, including her Nash equilibrium
strategy that has her playing "Heads" with a 1/3 probability. Thus, we can say, given
that player 1 plays her Nash equilibrium strategy of "Heads with a 1/3 probability,"
player 2 has no incentive to deviate from her Nash equilibrium strategy of "Heads with
a 1/3 probability" since she does no better for herself by so deviating. (The fact that
she' also does no worse is a problem for the theory in that it is essentially an equilibrium
theory rather than a theory for how to play the game ab initio; why, of all those strate-
gies over which she is indifferent, does she feel any compulsion to play the Nash equi-
librium strategy in particular? For an indication of how one game theorist handles this
problem, see Robert J. Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Exfnession of Bayesian Ra-
tionality, 55 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1987). Aumann describes a correlated equilibrium ap-
proach that does away with the dichotomy usually perceived between the "Bayesian"
and the "game-theoretic" view of the world by synthesizing the two viewpoints and con-
sequently not requiring explicit randomization on the part of the players. Id. at 1.)
And we can also say all this of player 1 if player 2 chooses to play (her Nash equilib-
rium strategy) "Heads with a 1/3 probability." Thus, the playing of "Heads" with a 1/3
probability by each player is a Nash equilibrium for the game since no player, given the
strategy choice by the other player, can improve her own payoff by adopting an alter-
native strategy.
73 Michael Bacharach, "We" Equilibria: A Variable Frame Theory of Cooperation
5 June 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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same sort of thinking in the other player as well. The other sort of
thinking that Bacharach identifies is thinking in a "we" frame.74 The
"we" frame encourages each player to think about the profile S of
strategies (one for each player) that should be adopted by the players
as a group and then identifies the rational strategy for each player as
the one that simply (categorically, nonconditionally) has that player
"doing her part" Si within that overall profile.
75 Unlike in the "I/he"
frame, a player in the "we" frame does not have to consider whether
the other players are themselves doing their parts as components of
this profile of strategies in order tojustify her strategy choice. Rather,
in response to any question about why she was doing what she was do-
ing, she would only say, "This is simply what we do when we do S (as
best)," or, perhaps (to emphasize how the collective understanding
orders the particularity of her individual choice), "This is simply what
I do when we do S (as best)," or even, most provocatively (because
most categorical in tone), "This is simply what it is for us, you and me,
to do S (as best)."
It should be apparent that Bacharach's "we" frame is closely akin
to the collective understanding that Shafir and Tversky propose as an
explanation for the disjunction effect that they observed in the play of
the prisoner's dilemma game.7 It will be recalled that there was a
greater propensity for an experimental subject to cooperate when the
strategy choice of the other player in the game was still uncertain. In
that situation, the outcome of the game still had to be collectively de-
termined by the strategy choices of both players, something that put
each player in a more collective (and, it seems, a more cooperative)
frame of mind. On the other hand, when the strategy of the other
player is given, be it to cooperate or not, then the game becomes one
in which the one remaining player chooses to determine the outcome
of the game, something that provides for a more individualistic frame
of mind. This experiment essentially reproduces the "we" frame and
74 Id.
75 Robert Sugden's notion of "team reasoning" has a similar structure. See Robert
Sugden, Team Preferences, 16 ECON. & PHIL. 175, 176 (2000) (arguing that "the theory
of choice should allow 'teams' of individuals to be decision-making agents and should
allow such teams to have preferences"); Robert Sugden, Thinking as a Team: Towards
an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior, 10 SOC. PHIL. & PUB. POL'y 69, 89 (1993) (assert-
ing that "reasons for cooperating do indeed exist, but that these reasois can get a grip
only if we conceive of ourselves as members of a team").
76 See supra text accompanying notes 37-45 (noting that the disjunction effect that
occurs depends on whether a player knows if the other player has already chosen her
strategy).
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the "I/he" frame for the subjects, and provides some empirical sup-
port for Bacharach's dualistic account of thinking.
It is important to emphasize that what Bacharach's account pro-
vides for, and what the Shafir-Tversky experiments support, is the idea
of categorical reason, or the notion that it is a different understanding
that informs choice under the "we" frame. It would be a mistake, for
example, to think that the "we" frame only introduces a different,
more collective, sort of motivation, one that merely identifies "doing
one's part" with the (more conditional, less categorical) idea that "I
will cooperate if she does." To begin, the latter idea is not consistent
with what the Shafir-Tversky experiments show; the subjects tended to
be noncooperative almost as frequently when the other player was
known to be cooperating as when the other player was known to be
not cooperating. Second, this sort of conditional cooperation would
do nothing to get the players out of the strategic limbo of the pure
coordination game, a limbo that arises precisely because of an infinite
regress of mutually conditioning conditionals. Third, the idea of do-
ing one's part as (merely) conditional cooperation would have no im-
pact on the play of the prisoner's dilemma game, where, in game the-
ory at least, the player has a dominant (not a conditional) strategy not
to cooperate regardless of what the other player does. Rather, what the
Bacharach account provides, and what the experiments support, is an
idea powerful and categorical enough to take us beyond the problem-
atic regress of the pure coordination game and as far as thinking, at
least presumptively, 7 that what the other player does, and what one
should do given what the other player does, is not even the right way
to think about strategic choice. The last thought undermines domi-
nance thinking in the prisoner's dilemma as much as it circumvents
the infinite regress of the pure coordination game.
However, now the worry might be that we have ended up with an
account of rational cooperation that is too unconditional, that is, one
that is implausible precisely because it ignores what the other player
might be doing. Indeed, this is what might be suggested by the very
word categorical, and the somewhat Kantian overtones in the phrase
categorical reason. The Kantian, it is often said, cooperates absolutely,
or just because it is right, and without regard to the contingencies of
what others might choose to do. But, however Kantian that might be,
77 This is an important qualification, already hinted at supra note 7. The idea is to
allow coordination and cooperation to get started, not to commit to either absolutely.
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it is a mistaken understanding of what is meant here by categorical in
the phrase "categorical reason."
Consider again the earlier etiquette example. 8 That example in-
volved categorical reason because the issue of etiquette was only rele-
vant for those partitions or sets that included the big and small apples
as alternatives for choice. For the other partitions or sets, etiquette
was not relevant at all In that limited partition-dependent sense, a
sense problematic for WARP, the concern for etiquette was categori-
cal. But it would be a mistake to think that the concern for etiquette
was absolute as compared to, say, the hedonistic interest in eating
larger pieces of fruit. It might be, therefore, that the difference in size
between the large and small apple could become so large that the he-
donistic interest in larger pieces of fruit would overwhelm (even
rightly) the concern for etiquette. In such a situation, with the parti-
tion-dependent effect overwhelmed, there would indeed be transitivity
of preference and no violation of WARP. However, the point of the
example was not to argue that transitivity or WARP never obtain, but
only to suggest that these properties need not always obtain in the way
that rational choice theory suggests. Thus, in this respect, the ex-
treme or uncompromising view is the one offered by rational choice
theory, not the one offered by the theory of categorical reason.
And the same could be said for the theory of cooperation based
on categorical reason. An agent acting under a collective understand-
ing or "we" frame might begin presumptively and categorically with the
thought that she should "do her part" in S because that is what it is for
us, you and me, to do S (as best). But the agent need not think of
herself as absolutely committed to cooperation under strategy S. If too
few others do their part, for example, there may be no "whole" of
which one's own individual choice can sensibly be construed or un-
derstood as a part. This may call for a rational revision of what it is
that one is doing and allow, therefore, for the possibility of not coop-
erating if others are not cooperating as well." However, this should
78 Supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
79 For a discussion of conditional or presumptive cooperation as a kind of "revis-
able rationality," see Chapman, supra note 30, at 472-76. 1 have argued elsewhere,
Bruce Chapman, Rational Voluntarism and the Charitable Sector, in BETwEEN STATE AND
MARKET: EssAYs ON CHARITIES LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA 127 (Jim Phillips et al. eds.,
2001), that this account of presumptive cooperation provides a better explanation of
voluntary contributions to public goods, such as in the relief of poverty through chari-
table contributions; than does the theory of rational choice (never cooperate) or Kan-
tian obligation (always cooperate). Moreover, the presumptive cooperation account
can make more sense of the tax treatment of charitable contributions, and the empiri-
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not be thought of as resurrecting the idea of a purely conditional co-
operation. A purely conditional cooperation is still too much in the
"I/he" frame, and makes no sense at all of a (prior, albeit only pre-
sumptive) collective understanding of one's action. What categorical
reason rationally requires, therefore, is a defeasible presumption in
favor of cooperation, not an absolute (and thoughtless) commitment
to it.
CONCLUSION
There is a kind of "incompleteness" in the idea of categorical rea-
son that should freely be admitted. An agent who only sees, or under-
stands, alternatives for choice under the aspect of more general con-
cepts, or categories of thought, does not, perhaps, fully appreciate
these alternatives in all their particularity. Any given categorization
need not be crude, of course, but short of reproducing a range of
categories that is as detailed and fine as the particular alternatives it
seeks to organize, it seems inevitable that something must be lost if
choice is to be ordered by categorical reason.8
In rational choice theory, by contrast, the fully rational agent can
compare all possible alternatives for choice. It is true that agents in
the actual world are not thought to be fully rational in this way, but
that is the ideal. Thus, when we say of someone, "She bought the
Volvo because she likes durable cars," in rational choice theory we
mean to concede that she probably approached the problem of
choice as best she could, but also that, ideally, she would not have lim-
ited herself by these broad generalizations and would have compared
(in detail) all the possible alternatives that she might have chosen.
Rough categorizations and broad rules of thumb are only needed be-
cause an agent must make her way through what would otherwise be
an "incomprehensibly large number of alternatives, most of which
represent unimportant variations on each other."8"
cal evidence on how individuals respond to these different tax incentives, than car) ra-
tional choice or Kantian theory. See id. at 130 (outlining the complex motivational
structure of homo socioeconomicus).
80 The incompleteness of choice ordered by categorical reason can easily be ap-
preciated if one reconsiders the criminal trial example, supra text accompanying notes
67-68. While all three alternatives discussed there are available as a final choice, the
"verdict first, sentence afterwards" choice process (which makes outcome I the "not-
between" alternative in the triple) does not permit a (sensible) pairwise comparison
(or choice) between alternative I and either alternative GS or alternative GL. This
noncomparability of certain pairs of alternatives violates completeness.
81 Doyle & Thomason, supra note 62, at 61.
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For the rational choice theorist, therefore, something of rational-
ity is lost as we move from a fully particular comparison of all possible
alternatives to a comparison constrained by categorization. But there
must be something gained for rationality as well. For what makes a
comparison of all possible alternatives in their full particularity "in-
comprehensible" is not merely that the set of alternatives is "large." It
is also that, without some such categorization, the particularity of
choice would literally be "unthinkable." We think through to the par-
ticulars of our world, after all, only under the aspect of more general
concepts or categories of thought.
So we should not be surprised that there is a notion of ideal ra-
tionality that competes with the full rationality of rational choice the-
ory and pulls us in an opposite direction, that is, from particular to
general rather than from general to particular. However, I hope to
have shown in this Article that the tendency to reduce the general to
the particular, all in the name of a more fully rational choice, contin-
ues to plague rational choice theory. Sometimes this tendency shows
up as the temptation to see alternatives for choice in a partition-
independent way, as if features of the alternatives themselves were all
that mattered for choice and never features shared with other alterna-
tives in the choice set. This is what our discussion of the choice con-
sistency condition WARP revealed. At other times, the propensity for
particularity is manifested in the tendency to reduce what is attractive
in a whole to what is attractive in its parts. But, as we saw in our dis-
cussion of the sure thing principle (or strong independence condi-
tion), our understanding of a choice situation and, therefore, what we
should rationally do under that understanding, varies according to
whether the choice is seen as a whole or as a disjunction of its parts.
These different notions of rationality have been in play in the be-
haviorists' experiments on choice for some years now. But, for the
most part, the results of these experiments have not been organized
under an alternative conception of rational choice. This Article has
tried to suggest that the alternative conception that is required, one
based on categorical reason, is part of a long-standing theoretical tra-
dition, and that rational choice theorists would do well to look to this
tradition to solve some systematic difficulties that they confront in so-
cial choice theory and the theory of games. That law forms part of
this tradition of categorical reason suggests further, perhaps, that le-
gal theorists have a special obligation to show them the way.
